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INTRODUCTION

T

HE MODERN SATELLITE communications industry was
but a flicker of an idea prior to World War II, yet today,
communications satellites serve as crucial hubs in the transmission of vital data that help shrink the world.1 Technological innovation in the industry after the Soviet Union’s 1957 launch of
Sputnik I, the first satellite to successfully orbit the Earth,
progressed so rapidly that by 1964, satellites were used to televise portions of the Tokyo Olympics.2 Furthermore, the rapid
development in the years following the launch of Sputnik I possessed an extremely international flavor.3 As the satellite communications industry grew through a combination of efforts
from governmental entities and private enterprise, so too did
the burgeoning sector’s need for governance and regulation become apparent, both on a domestic and international level.4
Paralleling the rapid and pervasive adoption of satellite communication technology in the latter half of the twentieth century is the explosive growth of internet consumption and the
drastic increase in the commoditization of internet users’ personal data over the first two decades of the twenty-first century.5
With data privacy regulations recently promulgated in both California and Europe, companies of all sorts face an additional regulatory requirement that calls for constant attention in the face
of penalties.6 The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)7
1 See Hugh Richard Slotten, Satellite Communications, Globalization, and the Cold
War, 43 TECH. & CULTURE 315, 315 (2002) (discussing the impact of global
communications).
2 See Stephen E. Doyle, Communication Satellites: International Organization for Development and Control, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 431, 432 (1967); David J. Whalen, Communications Satellites: Making the Global Village Possible, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE
ADMIN., https://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/satcomhistory.html
[https://perma.cc/FW8U-NE4Y] (last updated Nov. 30, 2010).
3 See Doyle, supra note 2, at 432; Whalen, supra note 2.
4 See Slotten, supra note 1, at 325–31.
5 See Elizabeth deGrazia Blumenfeld, Privacy Please: Will the Internet Industry Act
to Protect Consumer Privacy Before the Government Steps In?, 54 BUS. LAW. 349, 350–51
(1998); Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2056, 2057–58 (2004) (stating that data “privacy [i]s the result of legal restrictions and other conditions . . . that govern the use, transfer, and processing of
personal data.”).
6 See, e.g., Daisuke Wakabayashi, California Passes Major Online Privacy Law, N.Y.
TIMES (June 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/technology/cali
fornia-online-privacy-law.html [https://perma.cc/9DL5-2QUW].
7 See generally General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L119/
1) (EU).
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enacted by the European Union (E.U.) imposes restrictions on
satellite telecommunications players—especially regarding direct-to-home broadcasting, the flow of data to and from a satellite, and the provision of geolocation services.8 However, the
reach of the GDPR is limited and protects mainly European end
users of satellite telecommunications infrastructure from the unauthorized use and collection of their personal data by thirdparty actors.9 Thus, when viewed outside the scope of the GDPR,
the current regulatory landscape concerning the privacy and
protection of data transmitted from Earth to one or more satellites and back again lacks comprehensiveness and clarity. Because of the nature of satellite communication, globalization,
and inadequate current regulations, the world needs a set of
uniform principles to govern the protection of personal data
when it is beamed to and from satellites.
For ease of reading and the purpose of clarity, this Comment
will be divided into sections. Section II will cover background
information about the satellite telecommunications industry.
This includes a brief overview of the technology inherent to satellite communications and a detailed discussion of the current
state of the industry and its future outlook. Section III will discuss the regulatory bodies and relevant law governing the satellite telecommunications industry from both a U.S. and
international perspective. This section will also highlight the
E.U. data privacy regulations and discuss their impact on satellite telecommunications providers. Section IV will analyze the
shortcomings of current regulations covering the satellite telecommunication industry and advocate for an international
framework blending existing United Nations (U.N.) treaties
with data privacy liability and compliance frameworks. Finally,
the conclusion will tie all the parts together and reinforce the
rationale behind adopting a multilateral approach to the issue
of data privacy and protection when information is processed,
transmitted, or stored using communication satellite
infrastructure.
8 See Adrienne Harebottle, GDPR Is Here but, What Does It Really Mean for Satellite?, VIA SATELLITE (May 30, 2018), https://www.satellitetoday.com/business/
2018/05/30/gdpr-is-here-but-what-does-it-really-mean-for-satellite/ [https://per
ma.cc/W4ED-URY3]; see also Magda Cocco & Helena Correia Mendonça, GDPR
for Satellite Operators: What You Need to Know, VIA SATELLITE (July 2018), http://
interactive.satellitetoday.com/via/july-2018/gdpr-for-satellite-operators-what-youneed-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/8TKA-MKJ9].
9 See Harebottle, supra note 8.
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HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF SATELLITE
COMMUNICATIONS
A.

SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

FROM

Satellite communication grew from the dreams of Arthur
Clarke who, in 1945, wrote an article envisioning manned space
satellites distributing television feeds.10 After the Soviets successfully launched Sputnik I, “satellites were primarily used by the
United States and the Soviet Union for maintaining peace and
security.”11 However, private entities such as AT&T spearheaded
research into the technological hurdles presented and financial
opportunities afforded by a push towards satellite communication.12 To have an informed view of the proposed changes to the
modern satellite communication regulations requires an understanding of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962.13
In the Communications Satellite Act, nearly all of which is
now replaced, Congress authorized the United States to “sponsor a global satellite consortium to provide nondiscriminatory
service to all nations.”14 The United States subsequently ratified
a treaty in 1971 that established the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT).15 For the next two
decades, the United States “effectively guaranteed the success of
INTELSAT’s single global system,” through a series of regulatory
controls.16 The United States’ signatory body to INTELSAT was
the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT), a private corporation to “provide for high quality and economical
satellite communications,” and it essentially served as a conduit
See Whalen, supra note 2.
Sarah M. Mountin, The Legality and Implications of Intentional Interference with
Commercial Communication Satellite Signals, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 101, 109 (2014).
12 See Whalen, supra note 2.
13 See Communications Satellite Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-624, 76 Stat. 419;
Doyle, supra note 2, at 432–34.
14 Bert W. Rein & Carl R. Frank, The Legal Commitment of the United States to the
INTELSAT System, 14 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 219, 219 (1989).
15 See id.; see also Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications
Satellite Organization “INTELSAT,” Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 1220 U.N.T.S.
22; Operating Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization “INTELSAT,” Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 4091, 1220 U.N.T.S.
149.
16 Rein & Frank, supra note 14, at 220.
10
11
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for Earth stations and INTELSAT to provide “ ‘end to end’ services between domestic carriers and foreign entities.”17
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was
charged with regulating the satellite communications industry
in the wake of the Communications Satellite Act and the INTELSAT Agreement.18 However, as an indicator of the impending
privatization of the industry, the FCC encouraged competition
between private entities through an “open skies” policy, which
allowed and continues to permit domestic satellite licenses for
“legally, financially, and technologically qualified applicants.”19
This initial allowance of competition opened the door for further inroads and authorizations in both domestic and international privatization, as independent, international satellite
systems were eventually deemed not to pose significant, economic harm to INTELSAT.20 By the 1990s, INTELSAT’s nearmonopoly status had withered and “technological progress, deregulation and globalization fueled a huge rise in demand for
satellites . . . . From 1990 to 1996 . . . there were more satellites
launched (130) than during the preceding three decades.”21 By
the year 2000, Congress desired to effectuate the policy goal of
increasing global satellite communication competition by passing the Open-Market Reorganization for the Betterment of International Telecommunications Act (ORBIT Act),22 which
sought full privatization of INTELSAT.23
After the FCC certified that INTELSAT successfully met the
ORBIT Act criteria, it transferred its assets to a private Bermudaincorporated holding company.24 A Government Accountability
Office (GAO) Report indicated that market-access improvements in the three years after the privatization were somewhat
offset by legacy relationships that crystallized in the decades
17 Guy Krogh, Note, The Satellite Competition Debate: An Analysis of FCC Policy and
an Argument in Support of Open Competition, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 867, 870–71
(1989).
18 See id. at 871.
19 See id. at 873.
20 See id. at 885.
21 Daya Kishan Thussu, Lost in Space: Privatizing the World’s Satellites May Widen
the Information Gap Between North and South, 124 FOREIGN POL’Y 70, 70 (2001).
22 See Open-Market Reorganization for the Betterment of International Telecommunications Act, Pub. L. No. 106-180, 114 Stat. 48 (2005).
23 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-891, TELECOMMUNICATIONS:
INTELSAT PRIVATIZATION AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ORBIT ACT 1 (2004).
24 See id. at 8.
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prior.25 Despite the perceived market-access issues, the historical
trend clearly demonstrates that the stage was set for the postprivatization landscape to expand competition and overall
growth of the satellite communications industry.26
B.

THE RECENT HISTORY, CURRENT STATE,
AND FUTURE OUTLOOK

As the entire space industry has recently boomed to over $300
billion invested annually, with well-known entrepreneurs such as
Elon Musk and Richard Branson making splashy investments,
economists consider the utilization of a private corporation established by the Communication Satellites Act of 1962 as the
template for the now-decentralized space industry.27 When narrowing the focus to solely the satellite industry within the whole
space economy, private entities appear keenest to capitalize on
orbital launch, remote sensing (which involves providing images
of the Earth), and satellite data and analytics.28 Consequently,
outside investment in space-focused start-ups totaled $2.5 billion
between 2015 and 2016.29 Of the three primary growth sectors
for the current satellite industry, remote sensing, satellite data,30
and analytics have readily apparent interplays with modern data
privacy regulation. Launch servicing companies, remote sensing
companies, and data access and analytics firms all share a desire
to capitalize on the development and growth primarily in lowEarth orbit (LEO) satellites.31
Instructive to an understanding of the current rise and projected emergence of LEO technology is a brief overview of the
various orbital altitudes for telecommunications satellites and
the different uses associated with those altitudes. Geosynchronous communications satellites placed roughly 22,000 miles
above the Earth “appear from the surface to be stationary” and
See id. at 13–15.
See, e.g., Thussu, supra note 21, at 71.
27 See Matthew Weinzierl, Space, the Final Economic Frontier, 32 J. ECON. PERSPS.
173, 173–77 (2018).
28 See id. at 177.
29 See id.
30 See id. at 177–78.
31 See id. at 178; see also The Coming of Low-Earth Orbit Satellites, ECONOMIST (Dec.
8, 2018), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/12/08/the-coming-of-lowearth-orbit-satellites [https://perma.cc/9TQA-L52V].
25
26
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take one day to circuit the globe.32 Since they have unimpaired
access to vast swaths of the Earth’s surface and provide for “costeffective communications across vast distances, geostationary
satellites have proven ideal for the distribution of broadcast signals to large regions. They are also convenient platforms for various types of remote sensing.”33 While they serve key purposes,
geosynchronous satellites have crowded the orbital plane on
which they operate to an extent that limits the availability of useful telecommunications slots.34
The FCC categorizes commercial telecommunication satellites differently based on usage and orbital altitude.35 Fixed, geosynchronous satellites, both domestic and international, “are
used for voice, data, and video communications between earth
stations at fixed points,” and are categorized distinctly from: (1)
direct broadcast satellites, which distribute data directly to individual antennas; (2) mobile satellites, which function similarly
to fixed satellites but transmit signals to mobile antenna receivers; and (3) radiodetermination satellites providing navigation
and geolocational services.36
Even though geosynchronous satellites are key for data sensing, surveillance, and communications, the current trend of economic development indicates that LEO satellite constellations
are poised to be the solution that completes the global village.37
A main disadvantage of the current industry standard, geostationary satellites—which “send[ ] a signal that far requir[ing] a
hefty antenna and a lot of power,”—is that they are prohibitively
costly to launch and build.38 In addition to the infrastructural
demands, the distance required increases latency, impacting
voice communications and real-time data collection.39 LEO
satellites, on the other hand, “are lighter, less expensive to
32 See Lawrence D. Roberts, A Lost Connection: Geostationary Satellite Networks and
the International Telecommunication Union, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1095, 1099
(2000).
33 Id. at 1100.
34 See id. at 1101.
35 See Pamela L. Meredith & Franceska O. Schroeder, Privately-Owned Commercial Telecommunications Satellites: Licensing and Regulation by the Federal Communications Commission, 27 CAL. W. L. REV. 107, 110–11 (1990).
36 Id. at 111–12.
37 See Satellites May Connect the Entire World to the Internet, ECONOMIST (Dec. 8,
2018), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/12/08/satellites-may-con
nect-the-entire-world-to-the-internet [https://perma.cc/5P9A-2R8S]. See generally
Whalen, supra note 2.
38 See Satellites May Connect the Entire World to the Internet, supra note 37.
39 See id.
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launch and require less operating power . . . [and] can receive
communications from smaller and weaker earth transmitters
since the satellites are closer to the earth.”40 Since they are in
constant motion, LEO satellites must utilize overlapping orbits
or LEO satellite “constellations” to maintain continuous
connectivity.41
As a result, LEO has become a key driver in the private space
economy of the twenty-first century.42 The lucrative vision of
providing global internet connectivity using LEO technology is
projected to account for roughly $400 billion of space industry
growth by 2040.43 Since 2000, private companies from around
the globe, such as Starlink by SpaceX, OneWeb, and Iridium,
have ramped up their efforts and are increasingly obtaining approvals for and launching LEO constellations.44 Projections
based on FCC approvals for LEO launches indicate that for the
years 2020–2027, market participants “will have put more satellites into orbit by themselves than the total launched to date.”45
Furthermore, derivative industries like data processing and
cloud computing are heavily investing in and betting on rapidly
improving LEO infrastructure and technology to further goals
of latency reduction and easier access to ground centers.46 A recent corporate partnership announcement noted that Amazon’s
cloud computing and “data storage services will be integrated
into Lockheed Martin’s worldwide antenna network,” at least in
part to support and service ongoing satellite launches for internet-focused LEO constellation projects by SpaceX and
OneWeb.47 Many of the implications from increased human interaction with outer space are not yet known. Although attempts
at fashioning rules and procedures to prospectively govern humankind’s interaction with space may yield unforeseen externalities and could have anticompetitive effects, many argue that
such efforts benefit society more than a set of hastily drawn re40 Ted Stevens, Comment, Regulation and Licensing of Low-Earth-Orbit Satellites,
10 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH-TECH. L.J. 401, 403 (1994).
41 See id.; see also Satellites May Connect the Entire World to the Internet, supra note
37.
42 See The Coming of Low-Earth Orbit Satellites, supra note 31.
43 Id.
44 See Satellites May Connect the Entire World to the Internet, supra note 37.
45 Id.
46 See Aaron Gregg, Amazon’s Plan to Profit from Space Data, WASH. POST (Nov.
30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/11/30/amazonsplan-profit-space-data/ [https://perma.cc/DQ58-9QJY].
47 Id.
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medial principles effectuated to correct market failures that accumulated in an underregulated environment.48
Thus, in the twenty-first century, as the space economy surges
and LEO-supported global internet connectivity moves from an
aspiration to a reality, domestic and international legislators and
scholars must consider important legal issues ranging from monopolies and competition, to the licensing of launches,49 to liability apportionment for space debris damage.50 This Comment
narrows its focus to the interplay between the rise in LEO-supported internet connectivity and data privacy and protections.
To do so requires an understanding of the key regulatory players and guiding legislative authority, both domestically and globally, with respect to satellite telecommunications and data
privacy.
III.
A.

STATE OF THE LAW

THE LAW GOVERNING SATELLITE TELECOMMUNICATIONS

From a U.S. perspective, the FCC is the regulatory agency
tasked with the licensure and regulation of satellites pursuant to
the Communications Act of 1934.51 Within the FCC, the Satellite
Radio Branch handles most licensure requests for satellites.52
The FCC delineates LEO satellites into two categories based on
their radio frequency requirements.53 Next, the FCC assigns a
specific radio frequency to the satellite, and once assigned, the
entity “must petition the FCC for a license to construct, launch
and operate a proposed satellite.”54
While it is true that the FCC assigns radio frequencies to domestic applicants, U.S. treaty obligations shed authoritative light
on the actions and procedures of the FCC.55 The Outer Space
Treaty “forms the basis of international space law,” and “it supSee Weinzierl, supra note 27, at 185.
See generally Stevens, supra note 40, at 402.
50 See generally Emily M. Nevala, Comment, Waste in Space: Remediating Space Debris Through the Doctrine of Abandonment and the Law of Capture, 66 AM. U. L. REV.
1495 (2017).
51 See Meredith & Schroeder, supra note 35, at 108–09. See generally 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151–163 (2016).
52 See Meredith & Schroeder, supra note 35, at 109.
53 See Stevens, supra note 40, at 403 (these two categories are “small LEO satellites” that “operate below 1 gigahertz (GHz),” and “large LEO satellites” that “require portions of the radio frequency above 1 GHz”).
54 Id. at 404–05.
55 See Meredith & Schroeder, supra note 35, at 112. See generally Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
48
49
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ports the use of outer space for the benefit and interests of all
countries.”56 Deserving attention in the realm of data privacy as
it pertains to LEO-based internet connectivity is Article VI of the
Outer Space Treaty, which states that “[t]he activities of nongovernmental entities in outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.”57
Importantly, as currently constructed, the Outer Space Treaty
delegates supervision of private space-operating entities to state
signatories rather than to an international body.58
As the primary international regulatory body that governs the
activities of humans in outer space, the U.N. incorporated the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) as a specialized agency in 1947.59 The ITU “allocates the radio frequency
spectrum and requires the registration of frequency assignments
by each member country.”60 Along with managing the frequency
spectrum, the ITU is tasked with managing geosynchronous orbital positioning, conducting research, and promoting telecommunication aid in the developing world.61 These functions
uniquely position the ITU as a prospective leader in the enforcement of data privacy rules on LEO-supported global internet
providers and processors who essentially aspire to operate in
every jurisdiction.62 At the 2012 revision of the International
Telecommunication Regulations, some member nations sought
the inclusion of cybersecurity provisions “so that the ITU can
impose new regulations and establish itself as the organizational
home for international cybersecurity policymaking.”63 Although
these measures ultimately were not implemented,64 commentators noticed that the two principles set forth by the Outer Space
Treaty—that space is a common province for all mankind and
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
56 Erin C. Bennett, Note, To Infinity and Beyond: The Future Legal Regime Governing Near-Earth Asteroid Mining, 48 TEX. ENVT’L L.J. 81, 84 (2018).
57 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 55, art. VI.
58 Id.
59 See Roberts, supra note 32, at 1107–08, 1107 n.77, 1108 n.78.
60 Stevens, supra note 40, at 405–06.
61 See Roberts, supra note 32, at 1109–10.
62 Cf. Patrick S. Ryan, The ITU and the Internet’s Titanic Moment, 2012 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 8, 13 (2012).
63 Id. at 33.
64 Sheetal Kumar, Cybersecurity: What’s the ITU Got to Do with It?, FREEDOM ONLINE COALITION (July 9, 2015), https://freedomonlinecoalition.com/workinggroups/working-group-1/blog7/ [https://perma.cc/DMV3-HTFL].
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that individuals may own but take full responsibility for objects
launched into space—could provide insight for structuring an
ITU regulatory scheme covering the internet.65
As a result of the regulatory structure resulting from developments dating back to the Communication Satellites Act of 1962,
the current international regulatory scheme for satellite telecommunication is uniquely suited to merge the regulation of
satellite telecommunications and cybersecurity, especially given
ever-increasing globalization and the internet’s dependence on
satellites for a truly ubiquitous global scale.66 Thus, after reviewing the international regulatory structure for satellite telecommunications and that structure’s pertinence to domestic
licensure and regulation, one must grasp the theories, approaches, and policy justifications behind data privacy to determine a best method for interspersing the two disciplines.
B.

AN OVERVIEW

OF

DATA PRIVACY THEORIES

AND

APPROACHES

Words and phrases like cybersecurity and data privacy are
often thrown around without settled definitions, causing difficulties in the creation and enactment of coordinated, international policy recommendations.67 No discussion of data privacy
could commence without a brief mention of the internet’s
prominence facilitating international data transfers and new
markets, such as “the collection, organization, and sale of personal information.”68 The commodification of personal information has created a huge upside for criminals and led to data
breaches at well-known corporations such as Target and
LinkedIn that released the information of hundreds of millions
of people.69 Although there is no express constitutional right to
data privacy in the United States, the idea of the basic right to
Id. at 68–71.
See generally Martin M. Zoltick & Jenny L. Colgate, The Application of Data
Protection Laws in (Outer) Space: Data Protection 2019, in DATA PROTECTION LAWS
AND REGULATIONS 2019 (Tim Hickman & Detlev Gabel eds., 2019) (ebook),
https://iclg.com/practice-areas/data-protection-laws-and-regulations/2-the-appli
cation-of-data-protection-laws-in-outer-space [https://perma.cc/9FFJ-DL8M].
67 See Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 817,
823 (2012).
68 See Ryan Moshell, Comment, . . . And Then There Was One: The Outlook for a
Self-Regulatory United States Amidst a Global Trend Toward Comprehensive Data Protection, 37 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 357, 360 (2005).
69 Seth Fiegerman, The Biggest Data Breaches Ever, CNN (Sept. 7, 2017), https://
money.cnn.com/2017/09/07/technology/business/biggest-breaches-ever/index
.html [https://perma.cc/9622-NFL9].
65
66
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control one’s personal information has solidified over the
course of history.70 Data privacy applies general privacy principles to the sphere of information technology.71 Three primary
approaches for protecting data privacy include: (1) the comprehensive model, which creates general laws governing the use,
storage, and transmittal of personal data with an oversight body
to enforce those laws; (2) the sectoral model, which narrows its
scope to industries already determined to have substantial data
privacy concerns; and (3) the self-regulation model, which allows involved industry players to establish governance codes and
police themselves.72
Data privacy protections have recently been enacted against
this backdrop of varying approaches to regulating the satellite
communications industry. The E.U.’s GDPR73 adopts a comprehensive approach, enforced by a regulatory body that is headed
by the Data Protection Supervisor.74 The GDPR “grants extensive data privacy and protection rights to E.U. citizens, particularly through its material and territorial scope provisions,” which
define personal data broadly and extend the GDPR’s jurisdiction to data processors and controllers outside the E.U. if these
entities interact with the data of European citizens.75 Due to the
broadened jurisdictional reach of the GDPR, its impact is already being felt by the international satellite telecommunications community, even though the GDPR does not reach every
operator worldwide.76 Since satellite telecommunications providers are inherently involved in processing data,77 and potentially could be defined as data controllers under the
legislation,78 these companies face immense civil liability should
See Moshell, supra note 68, at 373–75.
Roslyn Layton & Julian Mclendon, The GDPR: What It Really Does and How the
U.S. Can Chart a Better Course, 19 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 234, 235 (2018).
72 See Moshell, supra note 68, at 366–67.
73 See generally General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 7.
74 See id. arts. 5, 68; Layton & Mclendon, supra note 71, at 235.
75 Matthew Humerick, Taking AI Personally: How the E.U. Must Learn to Balance
the Interests of Personal Data Privacy & Artificial Intelligence, 34 SANTA CLARA HIGH
TECH. L.J. 393, 402–04 (2018); see also General Data Protection Regulation, supra
note 7, arts. 2(1), 3.
76 See generally Harebottle, supra note 8; Cocco & Mendonça, supra note 8.
77 See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 7, art. 4(8). A “processor” is “a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which
processes personal data on behalf of the controller.” Id.
78 See id. art. 4(7). A “controller” determines “the purposes and means of the
processing of personal data.” Id.
70
71
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they fail to comply with the GDPR’s mandates.79 The GDPR’s
brave attempt at imposing uniform data privacy standards has
been met with much criticism.80 However, the E.U.’s promulgation of this legislation serves as a useful guidepost for any attempt to propose international regulations to specifically govern
data privacy standards and the imposition of liability for satellite
communications industry players.81
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL REGULATION
SATELLITE TELECOMMUNICATION DATA PRIVACY

OF

Many legal scholars have debated the costs and benefits of international and multilateral approaches to the exploration and
use of outer space.82 As previously mentioned, the most influential of the international treaties governing this field is the Outer
Space Treaty.83 At its core, the Outer Space Treaty allows all nations to freely use and explore outer space, and it forbids these
nations from appropriating space by means of “sovereignty, by
means of use or occupation, or any other means.”84 Thus, as a
result of the Outer Space Treaty and its ratification by nationstates, countries have a legal duty to the global community to
use space with an eye towards “maintaining international peace
and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding.”85 While the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty
likely could not have imagined the current scope and drastic
growth of the satellite telecommunications industry, especially
with respect to LEO constellations aimed at providing global
connectivity, they did address the use of space by nongovernmental entities by mandating that civilian space activities be licensed and regulated by national governments.86
See Humerick, supra note 75, at 404.
See generally, e.g., Layton & Mclendon, supra note 71.
81 Cf. Bennett, supra note 56, at 85 (noting that the Outer Space Treaty could
be the vehicle for the enactment of international legislation governing asteroid
mining).
82 See, e.g., Michael Viets, Piracy in an Ocean of Stars: Proposing a Term to Identify
the Practice of Unauthorized Control of Nations’ Space Objects, 54 STAN. J. INT’L L. 159,
163 (2018).
83 See id. at 166.
84 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 55, art. II.
85 Id. art. III.
86 See id. art. VI; see also Rachel Mitchell, Note, Into the Final Frontier: The Expanse
of Space Commercialization, 83 MO. L. REV. 429, 433 (2018).
79
80
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Because the structure of the Outer Space Treaty can be interpreted as ordaining both international cooperation as well as
national regulation of a state’s own space activities, nations have
taken an expansive view of their freedom to use space in ways
that benefit the individual nation more than the international
community at large.87 This practice is exemplified by the FCC’s
licensure and regulation of domestic satellites88 overlaid by the
ITU’s registration of orbital positions and frequencies.89 The
ITU’s regulatory structure also creates an ad hoc dispute resolution scheme that allows parties to turn to “any of a wide variety
of techniques, including negotiation, settlement in accordance
with non-ITU dispute resolution agreements . . . or any other
mechanism agreed upon by the parties.”90 Clearly, while the
drafters of the Outer Space Treaty envisioned a world where a
privatized space economy exists, the broad language and gaps in
the treaty created serious shortcomings and interpretive confusion regarding the regulation of the global satellite telecommunication industry.
A key interpretive gray area for entrants and existing players
in the satellite telecommunications arena is the delegation of
specific satellite radio frequency licensing by individual nations
after overall radio frequency and orbital allocation from the
ITU.91 This international regulatory scheme causes confusion
for two primary reasons: (1) the delegation of specific orbital
locations and frequencies to nation-states appears to be an improper appropriation of space in contravention of the agreedupon principles of the Outer Space Treaty;92 and (2) the emergence and prospective growth of LEO satellite constellations obfuscates the need for a two-step international and national
licensing procedure.93
87 Cf. Mitchell, supra note 86, at 438 (stating that the 2015 U.S. SPACE Act
provision granting property rights to space minerals potentially violates the
Outer Space Treaty).
88 See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 40, at 406–07.
89 See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 32, at 1112–13.
90 Id. at 1114.
91 See Stevens, supra note 40, at 406–07 (noting that the international allocation of frequencies is controlled by the ITU, but national regulatory bodies control the assignment of specific frequencies to satellites).
92 See Susan Cahill, Note and Comment, Give Me My Space: Implications for Permitting National Appropriation of the Geostationary Orbit, 19 WIS. INT’L L.J. 231,
241–42 (2001).
93 See Ryan, supra note 62, at 36.
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First, regarding the reconciliation of the Outer Space Treaty
with the current ITU licensing and delegation structure, Article
II of the Outer Space Treaty prevents any nation from appropriating “[o]uter space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies . . . by means of use or occupation, or by any other
means.”94 Furthermore:
It is important to note that the ITU process does not, strictly
speaking, allocate the frequencies or orbital positions that it registers. Authority to place a satellite into orbit and employ frequencies for its use rests with each sovereign state. The ITU acts
as an efficiency-enhancing resource through which sovereign
states attempt to avoid potential usage conflicts and as a convenient forum for resolving disputes that arise. Nevertheless, the
economic incentives perpetuated by the process as well as the
legal preferences accorded to successful applicants have a significant impact on the development and operation of geostationary
systems.95

Because each sovereign state possesses its own authority to
launch satellites, coupled with the ITU’s efficiency-inducing approval and recording functions, one could easily conclude that
each sovereign state actually allocates the portion of space in
which its satellites (both government and commercial) are continuously orbiting through the tacit approval of the other member states of the ITU.96 In the United States, “ITU regulations
have been implemented in the [FCC’s] rules codified in the
Code of Federal Regulations.”97 This codification of international law supports the theory that the United States, along with
every other nation that supports its own governmental or commercial satellite industry, is actually appropriating outer space
with worldwide approval. This interpretation cannot be squared
with a literal reading of the Outer Space Treaty because the allocation of orbital slots to individual nations via an approval by a
consensus of ITU member states should fall under the ambit of
“national appropriation” of outer space either through “use or
occupation” or the catchall “by any other means.”98 Bin Cheng,
a space law expert, states that space is “territorium extra commercium, or ‘territory outside commerce,’ i.e., territory which belongs to no State and is, under international law, not subject to
94
95
96
97
98

Outer Space Treaty, supra note 55, art II.
Roberts, supra note 32, at 1111.
Cf. Cahill, supra note 92, at 247–48.
Meredith & Schroeder, supra note 35, at 118; see 47 C.F.R. pt. 25.
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 55, art. II.
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appropriation by States or their nationals, though its resources
are.”99
Therefore, the appropriation of orbital slots in space to communications satellites that transmit both internationally and domestically rests on unsettled legal grounds.100 Though
international law dictates that space may not be appropriated by
any nation or entity, the nature of geosynchronous satellite telecommunications creates issues of scarcity within useful orbital
planes and incentivizes the allocation and use of the most attractive locations.101 The delegation of licensing and regulation of
satellites to member nations allows those individual nations to
inject their individual laws into outer space with every launch
and to create a firmly entrenched international regulatory
agency and scheme that calls for the partitioning and appropriation of outer space—in direct contravention of the Outer Space
Treaty.102 The lack of harmony between the international governance of satellite telecommunications and the foundational
source of international space law has created confusion about
the governance of telecommunications satellites.103 The ITU’s
mechanisms promote efficiency, reduce harmful interference,
and resolve disputes, since adherence by member states is
guided by their perceptions of the ITU’s legitimacy. At the same
time, the ITU mechanisms necessarily imply the principle that
distinct areas in outer space are suitable for allocation.104
Member states weigh the ITU’s authority using their perceptions of its legitimacy and efficiency,105 but the ITU’s authority
also depends on the nature of geosynchronous satellite telecommunications. Since geosynchronous satellites are commonly
used for communication signaling that does not place high importance on the speed or latency of the signal reception, much
of the new growth tilts towards the LEO sector because they “are
a better choice when latency matters,” including for “telecommunication, machine-to-machine connectivity and data transfer

99 Viets, supra note 82, at 167 (quoting Bin Cheng, The Commercial Development
of Space: The Need for New Treaties, 19 J. SPACE L. 17, 22 (1991)) (emphasis added).
100 See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text.
101 Cf. Roberts, supra note 32, at 1101.
102 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 55, art. II.
103 See id.
104 See Roberts, supra note 32, at 1117.
105 See id. at 1114–16.
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and analysis.”106 The current trends regarding LEO satellites will
likely diminish the importance of the ITU in its current form.107
Major hegemons, such as the United States and the E.U., have
submitted many reservations to the ITU’s resolutions, which undercuts the legal force of the ITU’s regulations against them.108
The ITU derives much of its efficacy from nations determining
that consensus in the satellite telecommunication industry creates fiscal and logistical benefits that would otherwise not accumulate under a fully market-driven approach.109
With respect to the future of LEO satellites, the ITU will only
play a critical role in their regulation and management if it promotes efficiency within the increasingly privatized industry and
creates benefits otherwise unreachable without government intervention.110 Since LEO satellites must appear in constellations
to provide broad or global connectivity, recordation of their frequency bandwidth and orbital location by the ITU is a potential
area for the agency to continue to assert power, promoting efficiency and creating benefits for private entities.111 By specifically
performing the initial recordation and voluntary allocation of
the orbital location of LEO satellites, the ITU would respect the
rules of the Outer Space Treaty by reducing the impact of domestic or regional sources of data privacy law on the satellite
telecommunications industry. As satellites of smaller size and
mass are deployed in greater quantities at lower altitudes with
the aim of “providing low-latency broadband with pervasive connectivity,”112 the imposition of domestic data privacy law onto a
fully globalized sector would reduce rather than promote efficiency.113 Current international space law lacks a “comprehensive regulatory scheme for commercial activities,”114 and is vague
or silent on issues specifically relating to data privacy and the
106 Simeon Rusanov, Satellite Industry’s Tipping Point, SEEKING ALPHA (Aug. 3,
2017), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4094178-satellite-industrys-tippingpoint [https://perma.cc/GZ8R-6JEQ].
107 See Ryan, supra note 62, at 34, 36.
108 See id. at 24.
109 See id. at 24–25 (quoting ROB FRIEDEN, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS HANDBOOK 60 (1996)).
110 See id. at 36.
111 Cf. Tony Pallone, 5 Trends in Satellite Communications on the Horizon, ITU
NEWS (Aug. 7, 2018), https://news.itu.int/satellite-communications-trends/
[https://perma.cc/W248-TXCY].
112 Id.
113 See Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in
Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1336–38 (2000).
114 Id.
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satellite industry’s role within the information technology
sector.
The ambiguity created by the tensions between the Outer
Space Treaty and the current ITU system of delegation for frequency and orbital slot allocation weakens the informal set of
international principles that have allowed enterprising nations
to engage in de facto appropriation of orbital locations in contravention of the territorium extra commercium theory that underpins the Outer Space Treaty.115 While the issue of orbital
allocation deserves its own consideration, the coinciding commodification of outer space (especially at low altitudes) and of
personal data illustrates that the Outer Space Treaty must be
altered or a new international agreement must be enacted to
match present commercial realities.116
B.

PROPOSED ALTERATIONS TO THE CURRENT
INTERNATIONAL SCHEME

Even though the ITU carries significant weight in the global
satellite telecommunications industry, its lack of truly formal
mechanisms may render it a weak option for the promulgation
of international data privacy regulations and compliance standards.117 On the other hand, the Outer Space Treaty is widely
ratified.118 Furthermore, the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Liability Convention)119 was adopted by the same signatories as the Outer Space
Treaty in response to satellite crashes, and it could prove to be a
fitting source for international data privacy law.120 In the pertinent part, the Liability Convention builds on Article VII of the
Outer Space Treaty and reads that a “launching State shall be
absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its
See Viets, supra note 82, at 167.
See P.J. Blount, Renovating Space: The Future of International Space Law, 40
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 515, 522–24, 527–28 (2012).
117 See Ryan, supra note 62, at 26–27, 36 (noting that national decisions often
differ from ITU recommendations and non-binding coordination attempts).
118 See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm. on Its Fifty-Eighth Session, Status of International Agreements Relating to
Activities in Outer Space as at 1 January 2019, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2019/
CRP.3, at 5–10 (Apr. 1, 2019).
119 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability
Convention].
120 See Bennett, supra note 56, at 85–87 (arguing for the use of the Liability
Convention to protect Earth while promoting asteroid mining).
115
116
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space object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in
flight.”121 Similarly, Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty creates
absolute liability for signatory nations for damages to “another
State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by
such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or
in outer space.”122
When read in conjunction with one another, the Liability
Convention and Articles VI and VII of the Outer Space Treaty
impose total liability on signatory nations “to pay compensation
for personal injury and property damage caused by its space objects on the surface of the Earth, or to aircraft.”123 The launching state124 assumes liability for damages caused by both its
government and private space launch entities by “ratifying or
acceding to either the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, or the Liability Convention of 1972.”125 While the intent of the drafters of
the Liability Convention centered on the apportionment of
damages and liability for satellite crashes,126 the two treaties can
be interpreted expansively to create a source of international
data privacy law regarding satellite data transmission. As a result
of the Outer Space Treaty, “[s]tates assume direct responsibility
for all actions connected or linked to them, including that of
non-governmental entities; all acts causing damage by such private entities are deemed to be acts of the State.”127
Additionally, the express obligation found in Article VI of the
Outer Space Treaty that signatories regulate and supervise national space exploration128 fits nicely with its liability apportionment provisions and the international claims process outlined in
the Liability Convention. Signatories would have an affirmative
treaty obligation to regulate their internal conduct and serve as
121 See Liability Convention, supra note 119, art. II. The Liability Convention
defines “damage” as “loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of health;
or loss of or damage to property of States or persons, natural or juridical.” Id. art.
I.
122 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 55, art. VII.
123 Paul Stephen Dempsey, National Laws Governing Commercial Space Activities:
Legislation, Regulation, & Enforcement, 36 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 8–9 (2016).
124 See Liability Convention, supra note 119, art. I(c) (defining “launching
State” as the state that launches, procures the launch, or from whose territory a
space object is launched).
125 Dempsey, supra note 123, at 10.
126 See id. at 9–10.
127 Id. at 13 (citing Bin Cheng, Article VI of the 1967 Space Treaty Revisited: “International Responsibility,” “National Activities,” and “The Appropriate State,” 26 J. SPACE
L. 7, 12 (1998)).
128 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 55, art. VI.
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the enforcement body for the satellite industry’s compliance
with international data privacy regulations promulgated in the
form of amendments to (or broadened interpretations of) the
Outer Space Treaty and Liability Convention.129
Treaty-based data privacy regulation of the satellite telecommunications industry already exists if one takes a widened view
of Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty, which says that signatories are absolutely liable for damages caused to the “natural or
juridical persons” of another state “by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer space.”130 If data
privacy violations or breaches are encompassed within the term
“damage” as used in Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty, advocates for treaty-based international data privacy regulation of satellite telecommunications can argue that signatory nations have
already acceded to the authority of the Liability Convention to
govern international claims and disputes over the unauthorized
access of personal data during transmission to and from communications satellites.131 Article XXV of the Liability Convention allows for the proposal and majority-approved adoption of
amendments.132 Thus, a series of amendments could be added
into the Liability Convention that mirror the GDPR, making
necessary alterations to fit the unique global satellite communications subset of the larger information technology industry.
C.

COMBINING

THE

GDPR, THE LIABILITY CONVENTION,
OUTER SPACE TREATY

AND THE

Crucial to understanding the rationale behind adding GDPRlike protections to the U.N. treaties governing space use and exploration is a recognition of the theoretical similarities between
space law and cyber law.133 The rapid growth of the space industry after the launch of Sputnik I is readily analogous to the
See Liability Convention, supra note 119, arts. IX–XXI.
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 55, art. VII.
131 See Viets, supra note 82, at 202, 211 (proposing that the Outer Space Treaty
and Liability Convention could be the basis for claims similar to those defined by
the ITU).
132 See Liability Convention, supra note 119, art. XXV; cf. Bennett, supra note
56, at 87 (proposing, for example, an amendment to the Liability Convention
that would define the term “space objects” in support of asteroid mining
initiatives).
133 See, e.g., David S. Weitzel, Where No Lawyer Has Gone Before? What a Cyberspace
Attorney Can Learn from Space Law’s Legacy, 10 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 191, 192–95
(2002); see also Ryan, supra note 62, at 27–28.
129
130
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growth of the internet industry.134 However, one key difference
between the growth of the two respective industries is that commercialization emerged much later in the space exploration age
compared to the internet age.135 Though the commercialization
of the two industries occurred at different stages within their
respective life cycles, it is clear that they are converging toward
privatization.136
The two key principles behind the U.N.’s array of space treaties are that space is a res communes, or the common heritage of
mankind, and that individuals may own objects launched into
outer space, though they must take responsibility for such objects.137 Similarly, “the Internet is an open res communes that includes objects (servers, web properties, proprietary systems) that
are owned by private entities.”138 Furthermore, the jurisdictional
issues arising within the field of space law and cyberspace law
are also similar.139 While objects like satellites travel through
outer space, “border crossings in cyberspace are rarely considered to be a threat unless the electronic transaction under way is
itself illegal. Nevertheless, the sanctity and protection of one’s
borders is considered to be one of the defining aspects of sovereignty.”140 Additionally, for “cybercrimes and cyberpiracy, the
application of universality principles, like those applied to sea
and air piracy should be considered.”141
The globalization and privatization of the once governmentdominated satellite industry, combined with a rapid technological innovation rate of the internet, calls for a set of universal
principles for protecting personal data during transmission and
for apportioning liability to negligent or otherwise at-fault actors
within the satellite telecommunications industry.142 When considering incorporating GDPR principles into either the Outer
Space Treaty or the Liability Convention, one must take into
account the implications of classifying satellite telecommunications providers as either data “processors” or “controllers.”143 As
mentioned, processors under the GDPR merely process data on
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143

See Weitzel, supra note 133, at 192–95.
See id. at 201.
See id. at 192, 201.
See Ryan, supra note 62, at 28–29.
Id. at 73.
See Weitzel, supra note 133, at 203, 205.
Id. at 195–96.
Id. at 205.
Cf. Zoltick & Colgate, supra note 66.
See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 7, art. 4.
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behalf of the controller, while controllers determine the purposes and means of such processing of personal data.144 The two
categorizations are not mutually exclusive and depend on the
actions taken by the entity with respect to the data.145
When combining the GDPR’s core tenets with a U.N. spacerelated treaty, satellite companies would seem to occupy the role
of data processors more often than data controllers. Incorporating the GDPR into a U.N. treaty would require that both terms
be defined because the GDPR dictates different standards of
conduct based on the two categorizations.146 Eliminating all controller requirements on satellite telecommunications providers
could simplify compliance and increase verifiability by industry
players, and it could diminish nations’ “reluctan[ce] to adopt
new treaties relating to space activities.”147 Because no sovereign
space actor will likely constrain its freedom to act in outer space
unless it can verify the other signatories’ compliance, one key
for applying GDPR-like principles to a U.N. space-related treaty
will be the ability to detect and pinpoint breaches or noncompliance that occur during the transmission of information to and
from a satellite.148 Since the basis for international regulation
would be ratification by nations party to the Outer Space Treaty,
the transmission of data to and from the satellite serves as the
jurisdictional hook requiring private entities’ compliance.149
Without the ability to detect hacks or breaches during the
data transmission cycle with the satellite, any attempt at crafting
international data privacy legislation through the Outer Space
Treaty would be unsupportable.150 However, recent evidence
shows that cybersecurity firms and governments are able to detect unauthorized access of data at the transmission stage.151
See id.
See id.
146 See id. arts. 4, 24–41.
147 See Blount, supra note 116, at 528.
148 See id.
149 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 55, art. VI.
150 See Viets, supra note 82, at 173–74.
151 See Chris Bing, Chinese Hacking Group Resurfaces, Targets U.S. Satellite Companies and Systems, CYBERSCOOP (June 19, 2018), https://www.cyberscoop.com/
symantec-thrip-satellite-hacking-trojans/ [https://perma.cc/4WHP-QCVY]; Herbert Lin, Attribution of Malicious Cyber Incidents 2 n.1 (Hoover Inst., Aegis Paper
Series No. 1607, 2016), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/
docs/lin_webready.pdf [https://perma.cc/2727-UYSK]; William G. Rich, The US
Leans on Private Firms to Expose Foreign Hackers, WIRED (Nov. 29, 2018), https://
www.wired.com/story/private-firms-do-government-dirty-work/ [https://perma
.cc/AHQ9-E9CZ].
144
145
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Furthermore, Iridium, an LEO constellation of sixty-six active
satellites, is known by hackers to have obsolete, unencrypted security and satellite traffic that “remains vulnerable to passive
eavesdropping by anyone with a software-defined radio, the Iridium toolchain, and some spare time.”152 Iridium’s vulnerability
to hacking is an apt illustration of the need for a GDPR-based
approach to tackling international data breaches for LEO
satellites.153
As LEO satellite technology permeates the market with the
promise of global connectivity, any attempt at amending a U.N.
space-related treaty to include a GDPR-style scheme must be assessed for its ability to govern the conduct of private entities.
Because the Outer Space Treaty and Liability Convention apportion fault to the nation-state for the damages caused by commercial entities,154 private entities would likely resort to
researching the international marketplace to determine which
national satellite licensing and regulation framework provides
the most convenience.155 Currently, Article VI of the Outer
Space Treaty provides a way for nations to protect themselves
from liability for damages caused by commercial actors.156 Space
law scholar Paul Larsen noted, “in order to obtain a launch license, nongovernmental operators can be and are required to
purchase insurance coverage reimbursing the licensing government for damages caused. However, many implementing national laws permit satellite operators to limit the amount of
insurance depending on exposure, and on available private insurance.”157 Therefore, the selection and designation of the
state of registration by private satellite entities is a crucial step to
the apportionment of liability to both governments and private
actors.158

152 J.M. Porup, It’s Surprisingly Simple to Hack a Satellite, VICE: MOTHERBOARD
(Aug. 21, 2015), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/bmjq5a/its-sur
prisingly-simple-to-hack-a-satellite [https://perma.cc/JZ5N-BZV2].
153 See State of Cybersecurity Report 2018, WIPRO 11, 29, 78 (2018), https://www
.wipro.com/content/dam/nexus/en/service-lines/applications/latest-thinking/
state-of-cybersecurity-report-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/HDJ5-KVPJ].
154 See Dempsey, supra note 123, at 13.
155 See Paul B. Larsen, Small Satellite Legal Issues, 82 J. AIR L. & COM. 275, 290–91
(2017).
156 See id. at 292.
157 Id.
158 See id. at 289–90.
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The GDPR provides individuals with the right to lodge complaints159 and the right to recover for damages suffered.160 On
the other hand, the Outer Space Treaty and Liability Convention allow for injured persons to “only recover under either
treaty through action brought on their behalf by a government,
usually their own government.”161 Reconciling these differences
between the GDPR and the space-related treaties, the grievance
process likely best suited to an international application involves
delegating adjudicative authority to national regulatory bodies
in a manner similar to the relationship between the FCC and
ITU.162 Should a treaty amendment incorporating GDPR-like
data protection standards with respect to satellite data transmissions successfully pass through the ratification and enactment
stage, national regulatory agencies would be tasked with the administration and enforcement of data protection standards that
are uniform among signatory nations.163
Such a layered regulatory structure could operate in a manner that would: (1) allow for signatories to implement national
procedures for individual citizens, private entities, or delegated
agencies or commissions to bring forward claims of data misappropriation or noncompliance;164 (2) allow signatory nations,
through their regulatory bodies, to adjudicate the merits of
their citizens’ claims in order to apportion fault among the
launching state or states involved;165 (3) allow utilization of an
international adjudicatory body such as the International Court
of Justice to determine final judgments between states;166 and
(4) provide the ability for liable launching states to seek recourse and contribution from the at-fault private entities,167 either through insurance requirements built into national
General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 7, art. 77.
Id. art. 82.
161 Larsen, supra note 155, at 292.
162 See Catherine P. Heaven, Note, A Proposal for Removing Road Blocks from the
Information Superhighway by Using an Integrated International Approach to Internet Jurisdiction, 10 MINN. J. INT’L L. 373, 398–99 (2001); see also Meredith & Schroeder,
supra note 35, at 117–18 (discussing technical requirements imposed by the FCC
on satellite operators).
163 See Zoltick & Colgate, supra note 66.
164 Frans G. von der Dunk, Sovereignty Versus Space – Public Law and Private
Launch in the Asian Context, 5 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 22, 30 (2001).
165 Cf. id. at 37–40.
166 See Viets, supra note 82, at 202–03 (discussing the extension of nations’ jurisdictions to objects launched into space under Article VII of the Outer Space
Treaty).
167 Id. at 202.
159
160
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regulation or through their regular internal claims processes. A
key provision of any combination of the GDPR and a space-related treaty would require international cooperation at the stage
in the process where signatories attempt to apportion fault
among the launching states. An alternative provision could include language that effectively allows any citizen of a signatory
state to file a claim in the country of registry of the satellite operator or any launching state. Cooperation or reciprocity should
naturally follow from Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty because, in space, signatories “shall be guided by the principle of
co-operation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their
activities . . . with due regard to the corresponding interests of
all other States Parties to the Treaty.”168
This scheme stands in stark contrast to the current framework
that has caused government competition to create the most
favorable, internal legal regimes to govern satellite licensing and
oversight.169 By adding the principles of the GDPR into a U.N.
treaty, signatory nations would have the treaty obligation to
abide by and enforce a uniform set of protection standards for
data transmission to their registered satellites. However, the
claims adjudication process would differ drastically from the
current formulation of the GDPR.170 One downside of such a
proposal could be that the multistep process and layering of international and national regulation will be too time consuming
to redress the damages caused by the original data breach.171
On the other hand, because Article VIII of the Outer Space
Treaty dictates that launching states retain jurisdiction and control over their satellites,172 attempts to establish universal jurisdiction173 to address the layering of national and international
regulations with respect to data protection compliance for satellite transmissions will be viewed with extreme doubt.174 A U.N.
space-related treaty that requires national control of satellite
communications licensing, management, oversight, and initial
claims assessment would maintain compliance with Article VIII
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 55, art. IX.
Cf. Larsen, supra note 155, at 292; Mitchell, supra note 86, at 445–46.
170 See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 7, arts. 77–84.
171 Cf. Ryan, supra note 62, at 36.
172 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 55, art. VIII.
173 See, e.g., United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 722 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Universal
jurisdiction is based on the premise that offenses against all states may be punished by any state where the offender is found.”).
174 See Viets, supra note 82, at 203–05.
168
169
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because the satellites’ nations of registry would retain jurisdiction and control over the space objects for which they are responsible,175 while they would also demand that their private
satellite operators adhere to a standardized set of data protection rules.
Nations have strong incentives to comply with the proposed
data privacy reforms and enforce compliance by their private
entities because the Liability Convention and Outer Space
Treaty create an absolute liability standard on governments for
damage caused by their sanctioned commercial satellite operations.176 Additionally, “a realistic policy of space law-making
should recognize that viable solutions to outer space issues can
be found only through multilateral negotiations that lead to legal regimes of universal scope.”177 Universality is of immense importance due to the rapid and globalized growth of the satellite
telecommunications sector because, as private LEO operators
emerge as the industry’s drivers, the viability of enacting a new
governing law to cover each data breach diminishes.178 P.J.
Blount of the National Center for Remote Sensing, Air, and
Space Law notes that “INTELSAT has spearheaded a movement
wherein commercial actors will exchange information about the
space environment in order that they may all operate more
efficiently.”179
The voluntary exchange of space-related information between
competing commercial entities and the promulgation of a uniform set of data privacy rules by competing nations share a parallel goal: “increasing efficiency and guaranteeing operability.
To this end, all the players, not just states will have important
input, and such mechanisms will be adopted at a variety of
levels.”180 As the LEO sector’s emergence coincides with the
growth of cloud data technology,181 standardizing data protection mechanisms should ease compliance burdens and promote
efficiency for multinational providers by: (1) eliminating the
Cf. Larsen, supra note 155, at 290–91, 295.
See Bennett, supra note 56, at 86; see also supra notes 121–25 and accompanying text.
177 Gennady M. Danilenko, Outer Space and the Multilateral Treaty-Making Process,
4 HIGH TECH. L.J. 217, 223 (1989).
178 See id. at 221–23, 234, 241.
179 Blount, supra note 116, at 530.
180 Id.; see also Mitchell, supra note 86, at 451–52 (“there is no shortage of
global interest in space and that could be harnessed to address the future of law
and humanity beyond Earth”).
181 See, e.g., Gregg, supra note 46.
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time spent interpreting divergent and often conflicting national
requirements; and (2) reducing discrimination against foreign
entities based on pervasive or industry-wide noncompliance issues in their home countries.182
Aside from the efficiency boost to private satellite operators in
the LEO space resulting from GDPR-based standardization, developing countries that employ a res communes understanding of
outer space also receive a benefit.183 As satellites continue to decrease in size and component parts become standardized and
cheaper, developing nations are no longer barred from entry
into the satellite telecommunications market by high costs like
they are for geosynchronous communication satellite launches
and operations.184
In October of 2018, Iran’s delegate to the U.N. noted at a
committee meeting “that small-satellites missions are increasingly important for developing countries . . . they must not be
subjected to an ad hoc legal regime that might impose limitations on their development.”185 He further observed that “existing regulations for the allocations of slots on the geostationary
orbit are based on a ‘first come, first served’ basis . . . . many
orbital slots are occupied by the most developed countries, leaving little chance for developing countries to enter outer
space.”186 At the same meeting, Nigeria’s representative noted
the significance of nondiscriminatory practices regarding geospatial data availability.187 However, Saudi Arabia’s delegate disclosed the launch by his nation of seventeen LEO satellites and
a telecommunications satellite partnership with Lockheed Martin, while Brazil’s representative mentioned the successful
launch of a joint remote-sensing satellite constellation with
See Reidenberg, supra note 113, at 1338–39; Paul M. Schwartz, Legal Access to
the Global Cloud, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1686–88 (2018)
183 Cf. Michael J. Listner, The Ownership and Exploitation of Outer Space: A Look at
Foundational Law and Future Legal Challenges to Current Claims, 1 REGENT J. INT’L L.
75, 86–87 (2003).
184 Cf. Clay Dillow, Here’s Why Small Satellites Are So Big Right Now, FORTUNE
(Aug. 4, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/08/04/small-satellites-newspace/
[https://perma.cc/H2HX-D7FT].
185 Delegates Stress Need for Data to Help Anti-Climate Change Action by Developing Countries, as Fourth Committee Continues Debate on Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, U.N. Doc. GA/SPD/674 (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.un.org/
press/en/2018/gaspd674.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/4RJF-X8L2] [hereinafter
2018 UN Meeting Report].
186 Id.
187 Id.
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China.188 The comments made by Iran’s delegate, along with
the multitude of successful launches of LEO constellations, indicate an emerging consensus in the developing world in favor of
reforming international regulations and ensuring standardized
data protection.189 The expansion of space programs by developing countries “is especially noteworthy because it reflects an
emergent democratization of space, which is one of the most
important factors in the changing distribution of power in the
current international arena.”190
As developing countries chase down the benefits of satellite
technology, including “advanced communications, a platform
for technology improvement, greatly enhanced geographic information,” and “international prestige,”191 the international
standardization of data privacy regulations promotes innovation
and satellite communications market entry by developing countries in a manner that is consistent with the requirements of the
Outer Space Treaty.192 Furthermore, insurance requirements
within the national licensing schemes currently employed by developed nations relieve these states from the burden of joint and
several liability and from bearing the full financial responsibility
imposed on launching states by the Liability Convention and the
Outer Space Treaty.193
Both developing countries and private entities in the LEO internet-connectivity sector should feel the positive impacts of
combining a GDPR-based amendment with an existing spacerelated treaty. On the other hand, the United States historically
remains hesitant to ratify new legal regimes and will preserve its
“interests in a strategic manner, and not subsume them to new
law unless there is an equally strong advantage.”194 In the case of
amending a U.N. treaty to include data privacy standardization
for satellite communications, the United States should view such
an overhaul as a promotion of American capitalism.195 Given the
Id.
Cf. id.
190 ROBERT C. HARDING, SPACE POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE SEARCH
FOR SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT ON THE FINAL FRONTIER 3 (Everett C. Dolman &
John Sheldon eds., 2013).
191 Id. at 4.
192 See Heaven, supra note 162, at 391–92; cf. 2018 UN Meeting Report, supra
note 185.
193 See Dempsey, supra note 123, at 31.
194 Blount, supra note 116, at 528; see also Mitchell, supra note 86, at 448–49.
195 See Reidenberg, supra note 113, at 1343–46. But see Mitchell, supra note 86,
at 448–49.
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United States’ current space industry dominance,196 American
commercial satellite operators enjoy significant economies of
scale.197 A likely result of enacting comprehensive satellite data
privacy regulations is that American entities’ existing competitive advantages will be supplemented and strengthened by compliance-cost reductions, services streamlining, and a riskspreading structure that promotes cooperation among global
competitors.198
V.

CONCLUSION

Hackers’ ease in penetrating the Iridium constellation in
2015199 serves as an example of an incident that would clearly
fall under the ambit of the proposed data protection amendments. Under the current regime, satellite data processors may
continue to negligently leave end-user data vulnerable to malicious actors without any consequence, given the present complexities in identifying governing regulatory bodies, relevant
law, and noncompliance by data processors and controllers.200
On the other hand, with the proposed framework, upon discovery of noncompliance, individuals or the FCC could theoretically institute an action against a company like Iridium, skipping
any adjudicative process involving international tribunals and
other nations, since Iridium is headquartered near Washington,
D.C.,201 to finally settle or adjudicate the financial penalty owed
by Iridium.202 Because the proposed framework would eventually guide the conduct of private parties, it would be more effective at promoting the cooperative principles of the Outer Space
Treaty than does the status quo.203
196 See, e.g., Greg Autry, America’s Investment in Space Pays Dividends, FORBES (July
9, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gregautry/2017/07/09/americas-invest
ment-in-space-pays-dividends/ [https://perma.cc/BYC9-LTB8].
197 See generally Gregg, supra note 46.
198 See Joseph Jerome, The GDPR’s Impact on Innovation Should Not Be Overstated,
CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Apr. 1, 2019), https://cdt.org/insights/the-gdprsimpact-on-innovation-should-not-be-overstated/ [https://perma.cc/53E7-P4U6].
199 See Porup, supra note 152.
200 See Nazzal M. Kisswani, The Reasonable Necessary for the Implement of Telecommunications Interception and Access Laws, 45 INT’L LAW. 857, 876–77 (2011); Zoltick &
Colgate, supra note 66.
201 Contact Us, IRIDIUM 77, https://www.iridium.com/company-info/contact/
[https://perma.cc/7G85-GTME].
202 See Viets, supra note 82, at 202–03 (discussing the extension of nations’ jurisdictions to objects launched into space under Article VII of the Outer Space
Treaty).
203 Cf. Danilenko, supra note 177, at 223.
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In addition to promoting international data exchange and cooperation, GDPR-based data privacy amendments would help to
prepare international regulatory agencies for the continued rise
of LEO constellations by creating compliance efficiencies and a
framework for apportioning fault across jurisdictional lines. Furthermore, along with stimulating the already-burgeoning LEO
industry, these proposed regulations would begin to bridge the
relative gap in national space development that arose due to
core rigidities within the ITU geostationary slot allocation
framework.204 Finally, this regulation would not be overly harmful to the United States’ strategic interests and would have beneficial effects on American LEO operators in the form of
promoting legal synergy and boosting the ease of compliance.205
Thus, the overall benefits of enacting uniform amendments into
international law should serve as an important legal and geopolitical check on “emerging space actors” who are “expanding
their space assets to ensure that they can leverage them for maximum commercial and national security advantages.”206
204 See, e.g., The Coming of Low-Earth Orbit Satellites, supra note 31; 2018 UN Meeting Report, supra note 185.
205 See Reidenburg, supra note 113, at 1336–39.
206 HARDING, supra note 190, at 6. Prominent emerging space actors include:
China, India, Japan, South Korea and Israel. Id.

